There is a growing body of research findings suggesting that prejudice reduction strategies can have unintended negative consequences, particularly by helping to stabilize systems of inequality. In light of these findings, a handful of scholars have suggested that the field be guided less by the prejudice reduction tradition, so as to focus more on collective action. While agreeing with the recent critiques of prejudice reduction, I argue that in more robustly embracing a collective action approach we should be careful not to abandon the notion of perceptualism that colored original thinking on prejudice reduction, lest we artificially narrow the scope of social psychological research and unintentionally ignore communities that do not fit well within current thinking in the collective action tradition.
The Suggested Shift in Focus to Collective Action
A number of researchers have voiced their support for a social psychology that better balances the recommendations of both the prejudice reduction and collective action literatures (e.g., Abrams, Vasiljevic, & Wardrop, 2012; Haslam, 2012) . Others, however, state that such a balancing act is not what is needed (on the "potential incompatibility" of these "opposing trajectories" see Dixon, Durrheim, Kerr, & Thomae, 2013; Dixon et al., 2012a) . For instance, Dixon et al. (2012a) write: "In our view, we cannot simply tack together a prejudice reduction with a collective action perspective whilst ignoring their incommensurable assumptions about the mechanisms through which change occurs (or is inhibited)" (p. 14). Rather, they lay out what they hope will be a more nuanced approach to the study of social change, one involving a more complex understanding of prejudice (as various "prejudices"), an increased emphasis on the relational nature of intergroup attitudes (including both advantaged and disadvantaged communities), and greater focus on the what, for whom, and when of social change. This new approach should not be confused with a balance between the prejudice reduction and collective action literatures, as the arguments are largely structured so as to place more weight on the collective active approach ("As readers will have gathered, we sympathize with the latter position," p. 13; see later discussions on these points in Dixon et al., 2013 ).
While we ought to take the recent critiques of the prejudice reduction literature very seriously, there is a subtle, but dangerous, premise underlying the suggested shift of focus towards a more collective action oriented social psychology and in the resulting suggestion that only via overt intergroup struggle can systemic disadvantage be remedied. Social change can and does happen in a variety of ways. The collective action approach, as currently understood in the literature, represents but one such path. What is more, while this path can "work" for a number of identities, it can be counterproductive and even harmful for others. While it is important that the field come to better understand the paths that are followed in examples of successful (or even unsuccessful) collective action, it is important in this global shift that we not focus solely on those social identities that allow for research within this model. In shifting towards a greater focus on social change, it is important that we also search for identities that are not easily seen when looking at the world through a collective action lens. In the next section I examine how the phenomenon of collective action often overlooks and even hurts collectives "in the real world." In the section to follow I then examine how social psychology, by focusing on collective action and the highly entitative groups that fit the model, often overlooks communities that are deserving of social psychological research in the name of social justice.
Fischer, & Leach, 2004) . Within the collective action model of social change, "an 'us' versus 'them' mentality is generally construed as functional and strategic" (Dixon et al., 2012a, p. 9) with the goal of increasing action on behalf of the ingroup.
The power of "simplifying" the ingroup also finds expression in G. C. Spivak's notion of strategic essentialism (Wolff, 2007) , whereby leaders of collective movements simplify the ingroup's image so as to strengthen the movement, while being aware of the utilitarian nature of this strategy. A related practice of "othering" is captured by the notion of ethnification, whereby minority identities are deemed important to point out and relevant (e.g., in media coverage), while majority identities are not (Eide, 2010) . The othering found in ethnification, as in essentialism, can be used to justify social injustice, but it can also be used, because of its perceived "uniqueness," to draw attention to voices that are otherwise ignored. While all communities are composed of a complex and heterogeneous set of individuals, collective action on behalf of the group can be stirred by feelings of singularity and unity (Greenwood, 2008) . The leaders of collective movements, the entrepreneurs of identity, often work to reify the ingroup, to make the group identity appear natural (via naturalization) and eternal (via eternalization), and thus to hide the fact of category construction (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001 ). These steps help to ensure that "their version is seen as the sole authentic rendering of identity -in other words, that it isn't a 'version' at all" (p. 390; see also Subašić, Reynolds, Reicher, & Klandermans, 2012) . Already in the 1920s F. H. Allport recognized this tendency to perceive human collectives, particularly nations, as having a unique essence that set them apart from others, calling this the nationalistic fallacy (Allport, as cited in Leyens et al., 2001) . As the foundational assumption of the social identity tradition recognizes, there is tremendous power in human collectives and shared identities, a power than can be dangerous and restrictive, but also empowering and liberating, even leading to the creation of new identities (Drury & Reicher, 2000) .
These various psychological processes that strengthen group identities and intergroup differences do not, however, always lead to collective action, let alone to successful collective action. In general, it seems that for some groups, in some situations, at some times, the retention of clear intergroup differences can be productive. At other times the blurring or even removal of those differences can lead to more desirable outcomes. For example, there is considerable evidence that shared superordinate identities can promote positive intergroup outcomes (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2009; González & Brown, 2003) , while there is also evidence suggesting that superordinate categories, like common humanity, can reduce the willingness to engage in collective action (Greenaway, Quinn, & Louis, 2011) . There is evidence that the retention of subordinate identities within such broader superordinate identities can be important, sometimes for minority groups (Crisp, Stone, & Hall, 2006; Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2009) and sometimes for majority groups (Guerra, Rebelo, Monteiro, & Gaertner, 2013; Guerra et al., 2010) , and that the effects of such categorization processes can be differently influenced by historical and cultural factors (Esses, Wagner, Wolf, Preiser, & Wilbur, 2006) . Within work on coalitions and other collaborative undertakings there is evidence suggesting that under various conditions both homogeneity and heterogeneity can be either beneficial or detrimental (Jetten, Spears, & Postmes, 2004; Polzer, Minton, & Swann, 2002; Snow & McAdam, 2000; Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986; Swann, Polzer, Seyle, & Ko, 2004; Williams & O'Reilly, 1998) , and of course this literature includes evidence that this relationship is moderated by other factors such as the degree to which group members focus on and value ingroup similarities or differences (Greenwood, 2008) . In some cases, intergroup injustices along one identity marker (such as race or gender) can blind us to those that appear along others (such as class; see Wilson, 1999; Wolf, 2013) , and yet there is also evidence to suggest that heterogeneous coalitions of groups occupying different spaces within unjust systems can provide unique benefits and work more effectively than each constituent group (or identity) on its own (Greenwood, 2008; Ostrove, Cole, & Oliva, 2009; Wilson, Journal of Social and Political Psychology 2015, Vol. 3(2) , 291-309 doi:10.5964/jspp.v3i2.324
Mazur 295 1999). Through this enormous body of literature we are gaining a better understanding of the situations in which shared identities and homogeneity can be beneficial and when unique identities and heterogeneity can be so.
What is important to underscore here is that the ease with which a given social identity can be reified and politicized within a given context does not necessarily reflect the level of disadvantage experienced by the actual flesh and blood members of that category. What is more, the very processes of category reification and politicization can not only sometimes fail to serve certain communities, but in certain contexts and at certain times, these processes can actually be harmful to some communities. I now explore a historical example to illustrate this point.
A Hidden Danger in Reifying Social Categories:

A Historical Example
During the rise of modern European nationalism in the early 20 th century, some groups dramatically improved their position, while others lost a great deal. What is more, some were even harmed along the way; not in the processes that gave rise to nationalism, but by the processes. The rise of modern nationalism was marked by
increased differentiations between what were often deeply interwoven collectives (Gellner, 1983) , and crucially by largely undercutting the perceived malleability and inclusivity of collective identities (e.g., the adjective "Polish"
shifted from being a multi-ethnic, inclusive marker of political affiliation -like "British" -to one denoting primarily Polish language, ethnicity and Roman Catholicism; Zubrzycki, 2006) .
Prior to this period, in the lands that were once the eastern part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Belarusian language, religiosity, identity and culture flourished, while the term Lithuanian had largely become regarded as a geographic, romantic and political notion (Savchenko, 2009, p. 37; Snyder, 2003, p. 40) . As a result of the national struggles that marked this period, struggles that can be thought of as generally following the current recommendations of the collective action literature, modern Lithuanian identity burst forth on the scene, while Belarusian identity would eventually fall into near obscurity (Ioffe, 2003) . Although the reasons for these tremendously large social changes were numerous and complex, as an important factor one can point to the relative ease with which these two communities were able to increase the clear distinctions between themselves and the surrounding communities (Ioffe, 2003; Snyder, 2003) . As Bilenky (2012) put it: "the making of one identity (for example, Ukrainian) inevitably resulted in the unmaking of others (Russian and Polish) […] in other words, the idea of nationality defined the perceptions of the 'other'" (pp. viii-ix). Lithuanian was able to distinguish itself from Russian by opting for the Latin alphabet, while simultaneously differentiating itself from Polish by the conscious adoption language closely related to Polish and Russian, under Tsarist Russia Belarusian readily adopted the Cyrillic alphabet used by Russian speakers.
Prior to the rise of modern nationalism, Lithuanian identity, understood as a body of people with the potential to readily embody an independent collective movement, was exceedingly small (Snyder, 2003) . People who could be identified as Belarusians, on the other hand, were widespread and numerous throughout the region. However, generally speaking, the masses of people in the region (including both "Lithuanians" and "Belarusians") would most likely consider themselves simply "locals" (tutejsi) (Applebaum, 1995; Savchenko, 2009) . Ironically (given the numerical superiority of Belarusianness over Lithuanianness), as a result of the differentiating and reifying processes of collective mobilization, Lithuanian would become a strong national movement, while Belarusian identity would be severely undercut and left, in an era of modern nation-states, with numerous identity problems, many of which it still faces today (e.g., surrounding such issues as the national language(s), national symbols, interpretations of history, etc.; see Ioffe, 2003) .
Belarusian identity was repeatedly torn between the more clearly defined and differentiated Polishness, Russianness, and increasingly, Lithuanianness. Ioffe (2003) calls this inability to clearly differentiate oneself from the magnetic push and pull of surrounding communities while repeatedly attempting to do so the pendulum effect.
Leaders of ("successful") collective movements often work to ensure that ingroup members first identify as part of the ingroup who side with their cause (Ross, 2006) , but then also that they subsequently remain part of the group, and that they not succumb to vertical or horizontal identity shifts into membership in other collectives (Ioffe, 2003) . The point is that some communities fit nicely into the current collective action literature and stand to benefit by following its recommendations, while others do not fit the mold so well and, ceteris paribus, run the risk of being harmed by those same recommendations.
This is an important example, not only because of its historical interest, but because at that time Belarusians (but not Lithuanians), as frequently disenfranchised and impoverished peasants, generally constituted a systemically disadvantaged group (Savchenko, 2009) , and would arguably have been worthy of social psychological research in the name of social justice. The rise of modern nationalism, which in many ways follows the suggestions of the current collective action literature, proved not to serve this community well. This is not an argument that Belarusian identity was not organized as well as other communities (and could therefore have benefited from more collective action), but rather, that it was qualitatively different from the kinds of identities that stand to benefit from collective action. As Ernest Gellner (1983) argued, "[i] t is nationalism that engenders nations, not the other way round" (p. 54). The argument here is that collective action functions in a similar way; it takes certain elements of identity, and only certain elements, and shapes them in its own likeness (as categorically differentiable from other communities).
It is also important to keep such examples in mind as similar processes are affecting other communities today.
For example, analogous debates are currently taking place around Afro-Latino identities in the Americas (HaslipViera, 2010; Hernández, 2003; Hooker, 2005; Grillo, 2010) . Members of these communities often feel pressured (e.g., due to bureaucratic or social demands) to identify as either African American or Latino American, two communities that have been able to categorically distinguish themselves from surrounding groups and to successfully galvanize a certain degree of collective action on behalf of the ingroup. Cape Verdean identity in the United States arguably faces similar challenges (Fisher & Model, 2012) Mazur 297 advantages and disadvantages of doing so (Chhuon & Hudley, 2010) . This is similar to the ways in which Belarusians, during the rise of modern nationalism, came to be identified, and/or to self-identify, as Poles, Lithuanians or Russians, groups that were very successful in mobilizing support for identities that contrasted with those of the surrounding communities (Zubrzycki, 2006) .
In percepualism social psychologists recognize that identities are malleable, contextualized, and dialogical processes, rather than fixed, categorical entities. In recognizing them as such, research in the social sciences can caste a wider net for identities of interest and can study a broader range of the social injustices that affect people's lives. What is more, this is not only an issue of present or past collective identities, but also reflects the creative construction of new identities not readily captured by more widely or frequently used categories.
Subtle Danger for Social Psychological Theorizing and Research
It is important to raise awareness to situations in which collective labels lead to social injustice. In this sense it is important to highlight shared experiences of injustice, especially as they often help to shed light on systemic injustice.
However, such awareness raising, be it on grounds of ideology or of shared experiences of injustice, can at times inadvertently lead to the reification of these social categories that lock people in place; what Ireland (2002) calls neoethnic tribalism. This is to say that in attempting to highlight the historical and constructed nature of injustice (look! people are making our/their world like this) by pointing to a shared ideological fight or to common experiences of injustice (the kinds of injustice we/they are experiencing), we can inadvertently naturalize that which we intended to historicize and deconstruct. As a result, the reification of social categories that can result from highlighting group-based struggles can make it difficult not only to imagine other potential identities, but it can also make it difficult to see collective identities that already exist and that may even flourish in environments marked by a more interconnected, porous and shifting set of identity markers. Just such an environment was illustrated above by the example of historical Belorussian identity. This is similar to the way in which those struggling against racism can inadvertently strengthen the perception of intergroup differences by, for instance, couching their arguments within the very same categories they were intended to deconstruct (e.g., see the notion of "the empiricist problematization of hybridity" in Teo, 2004, p. 98) . The use of certain essentialized labels can also reflect the projection of categories valued by the academic community onto the world of those communities scholars are attempting to support, thereby leading academics to see the peoples they study as a means of testing their models rather than as ends valuable in themselves (Kögler, 2005; Richardson & Slife, 2011; Teo, Gao, & Sheivari, 2014) . The power of perceptualism is not only that the negative (or positive) associations with various categories is really the product of the perceiver, but also that the very existence of these social categories themselves are in the eye, and actions, of the beholder(s). (Maton, Perkins, & Saegert, 2006) , psychology as a whole has been relatively slow to thoroughly incorporate the findings of intersectionality (Cole, 2009 Reid (1993) calls the "add X category and mix approach."
There are, however, some less common approaches to intersectionality that work to challenge pre-assumed categories in social science research and to undercut the apparently "natural" and "inevitable" social categories on which such research is frequently based (particularly by taking into consideration anticategorical complexity; McCall, 2005) . There have also been explicit suggestions that intentionally widen the scope of research beyond the social identity approach's relatively narrow focus on intergroup relations, for instance, by considering intragroup relations and cross cultural differences in attachments to collectives (e.g., Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Brown et al., 1992; Yuki, 2003) . Researchers have also explored how individuals negotiate social pressures (e.g., in the media) to conform to simplistic, essentialized categories -often those very categories that social psychologists tend to study (Eide, 2010; Georgiou, 2006; Kim, 1994; Reicher, 2004) .
Interestingly, essentialist thinking can also blind us to past struggles for greater social justice, even those of which the field was once acutely aware. A fascinating example of just such a shift that is close to home for social psychology is the once prominent juxtaposition of Protestant versus Catholic within the literature on prejudice (e.g., Allport, 1954) . Particularly within the United States, this divide traditionally coincided with prejudice between groups of people who are today often lumped together under the heading of "White Americans." While meaningful inequalities between the communities still exist -as illustrated by the fact that despite Catholicism being the largest single Christian denomination in the U.S. (Linder, 2012) , to date there has been only one Catholic President (John F.
Kennedy) -today this issue is rarely, if ever, examined by social scientists (Alba, 2006) . Such "blurring" of these religious lines, much like the blurring of the once prominent lines between various ethnic European American communities, has occurred as part of larger, complex societal shifts, and not necessarily concerted collective action (as we are now talking about it) on the part of Catholics or of historically disadvantaged (now) White communities (Alba, 1992; Barrett & Roediger, 1997; McDermott & Samson, 2005) .
Social psychological research continues to evolve, and this commentary is not intended to disregard important developments in the social psychology of social change and collective action, such as the simultaneous consideration of minority and majority groups (Subašić, Reynolds, & Turner, 2008) , or the intersection of identity, emotions and efficacy perceptions (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008; van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004 ). The commentary is also not intended to disregard work on the various complexities of social identity, such as that on the role of context (Shweder et al., 2007) , various identity-based needs (Brewer, 1991) , identity change over time (Burke, 2006) , cross-cutting and nested subgroup identities (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000) , identity complexity (Miller, Brewer, & Arbuckle, 2009) , and relational identities (Sluss & Ashforth, 2007) . This is also not to say that there is no significant research or theorizing in social psychology that does examine collective identities in nonessentializing ways.
Even with these growing nuances, however, it is very easy to unintentionally or even unknowingly slip down the slippery slope towards essentializing the categories that appear in the social worlds we are studying. For example, arguments surrounding the notion of the engaged follower entail nuanced discussions of how social identities are Mazur 299
actively and interactively enacted in practice (specifically between leaders and potential followers); however, the assumption of categorical intergroup differences continues to underlie how such processes are discussed (e.g., "every mobilisation of one type of social action is simultaneously the demobilisation of other types of social action;" Reicher & Haslam, 2013, p. 126) . This thinking retains the functional antagonism between identities (as one identity becomes more salient the others become less so) of the social identity approach. A similar essentializing element of this approach that frequently appears in the literature is the determination of identity salience on the basis of normative and comparative fit (by which intracategory differences are minimized, while intercategory differences are emphasized) (Abrams & Hogg, 2004; Hornsey, 2008) . Similarly, an important element of research in the social identity tradition is that the mechanisms it predicts often arise on the condition that participants actually perceive and value the social categories in question (thereby at times artificially stressing the importance of these categories in research findings). While this is a strength of the social identity approach in that it suggests ways in which people can work together to fight injustice precisely because of shared identities that differ from those identities held by others (Reicher & Haslam, 2013, p. 115) , it is also a weakness in that it focuses on but one possible approach to social change (for a challenge to the social identity approach within the context of East Asia see Yuki, 2003) .
Concluding Remarks
Lest the argument here expounded be misunderstood, this is not an argument against applied research, nor against the activism of social psychologists; quite the contrary. It also recognizes the need to address the very serious challenges posed by the sedative effects of prejudice reduction. It is difficult to imagine social psychologists not being concerned with them now that so much evidence has been gathered. The fact that more and more studies are examining these problems would seem to indicate some degree of movement towards new knowledge and hopefully towards more effective and positive ways to improve intergroup relations and to promote social justice.
Rather, this is an argument that, as psychologists, we should be wary of the essentialism that accompanies the collective action tradition. Instead, we should more fully explore the implications of perceptualism. By breaking through the limits of artificial category walls, social scientists are able to more fully challenge the very foundations of the inequalities against which they raise their voices. This is what Alfred Kinsey did in his research on human sexuality, by largely rejecting the categorical hetero-homosexual dichotomy: "The world is not to be divided into sheep and goats. Not all things are black nor all things white. It is a fundamental of taxonomy that nature rarely deals with discrete categories" (Kinsey, Pomeroy, & Martin, 1948, p. 639) . This is also what G. Stanley Hall did in his work on adolescence, by challenging the division of people into adults and children alone (Hall, 1908) , and what Martin Luther King Jr. did in seeing working-class poverty across racial lines (Honey, 2011) . What made the messages of such figures so powerful and lasting was not so much that they worked to "balance the scales" as much as they showed that the very notion of the scale is problematic; as it forces both people and privilege into simplistic, counterbalanced baskets.
A revolution may perhaps bring about the fall of an autocratic despotism and of an avaricious or overbearing oppression, but it can never bring about the true reform of a way of thinking. Rather, new prejudices will serve, like the old, as the leading strings of the thoughtless masses. (Kant, 1784 (Kant, /1996 What M. C. Otto missed in the 1940s was that the "blindness" about which William James wrote not only referred to the negative light into which we tend to cast others, but also to the artificial and ephemeral nature of the us/them divide in the first place. He was not only encouraging us to like each other more, but to see the psychologically constructed nature of the social categories that ostensibly divide us. Other scholars recognized the power of perceptualism and called for us to build on it. During James' days, the likes of Charles Sanders Peirce advocated that we should not only move beyond the entitative view of human collectives whereby we believed them to possess defining, inalienable essences, but also that we move beyond the awareness that our minds shape our perceptions of the social world (perceptualism). Peirce and others advocated for a move "beyond binary perceptualism" (Ludwig, 2002, p. 37) , beyond the dichotomy between subject and object, by encouraging the study of semiotics and the various meaning making processes by which people make sense of their social world, precisely by engaging with it. Neither the objects of our investigation, nor the subjects doing the investigating, can be isolated and defined apart from the processes in which they become meaningful.
In this spirit, it has recently been argued that, so as to avoid working solely within easily accessible, pre-existing social identities, the field of social psychology should focus more on practice, referring to the ways in which social categories are enacted and brought to life in the social realm (rather than treating them as though they were categorical and fixed) (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001 ). This increased focus on practice builds on the earlier foundations of perceptualism, and is nicely illustrated in studies on crowd behavior and protester/police interactions (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Reicher, 1987) . By consciously paying increased attention to how social categories become meaningful through practice, "the danger of taking categories for granted is all but removed" (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001, p. 401) . There have also been recent calls for greater discussions around contextualized dynamic processes within the social identity and social representations approaches (e.g., Elcheroth, Doise, & Reicher, 2011; Spears & Klein, 2011) . Similarly, a recent methodological suggestion in this regard is that psychology treat the production of collective distinctions in practice as conceptually meaningful provisional pointers, rather than fixed, internally homogeneous sets (Falmagne, Iselin, Todorova, & Welsh, 2013) .
Social psychologists, and social psychology as a field, have a long history of fighting in the name of social justice (Kelman, 1968) . The field has also long debated the balance it should strike between basic and applied research (e.g., Aron & Aron, 1989; Kipnis, 1994) . It is important, however, that as social psychologists we not lose sight of the created and contextualized nature of social categories, irrespective of how practically effective essentialist thinking may be for activists. Such a distinction between psychologists and activists stands to work to the benefit of both. While social psychologists as individuals may work to further specific calls for social justice, thereby embracing and encouraging activism along the lines recommended by the collective action literature, it is important that we as a field not unintentionally limit our research to that tradition. Were we to do so, not only would we be doing a disservice to the field, but we would also be turning a blind eye to countless communities that don't fit the mold of the current collective action literature. By retaining the malleability afforded the field by the historical shift to perceptualism, and by moving towards a greater focus on practice, social psychology can also help shed light on injustice that remains undetected or underappreciated, and can therefore work on behalf of social justice in a way that activism alone cannot.
